Wiene's avant-garde production of THE CABINET OF DR CALIGARI (1920) 
Introduction
Historically, we have tended to accept a distinction between reality and imagination, with the ,real' world perceived as being ,out there' and the imaginary world of the mind being thought of as 'in here', in the head. However, neuroscientific evidence gathered over recent decades has shown that areas of the brain involved in the direct perception of objects in the world overlap with areas of the brain involved in visualising or imagining objects.
1 In other words, as far as the brain is concerned, there are no separate compartments for dealing with reality and the imaginary; in many ways they are treated as the same. This finding may have significant implications for how we understand the relationship between the mind and the world, and in this paper I want to explore some of them through a consideration of art and cinema.
1 Miyashita, Yasushi (1995) . How the brain creates imagery: Projection to primary visual cortex. Science, 268, 1719 Science, 268, -1720 Ishai, Alumit & Sagi, Dov (1995) . Common mechanisms of visual imagery and perception. Science, 268, 1772 Science, 268, -1774 masterpiece of German avant-garde Expressionist cinema noted for its stylised visual appearance. Towards the end of the film there is a prolonged still of a hand-written letter followed by a wipe to the next scene. At this moment I experienced something that profoundly impressed me. Despite the screen being full of clearly delineated forms I was momentarily lost, unable to recognise what I was seeing. Some two seconds later -as a human figure rose from a bending posture -a wave of recognition overcame me, even though the image had changed only marginally. Figure 1 shows two frames from this sequence, the left hand image shows the point of non-recognition and the right image shows the point of recognition. I remember the intervening period being marked by a mild sense of panic, mixed with a brief euphoria. I had seen the world in a way that was at once detailed yet devoid of distinguishable objects.
[Insert Figure And suddenly for the first time I saw a picture. That it was a haystack [or rather, a grain stack], the catalogue informed me. I didn't recognise it … And I noticed with surprise and confusion that the picture not only gripped me, but impressed itself ineradicably upon my memory. Painting took on a fairy-tale power and splendour. And, albeit unconsciously, objects were discredited as an essential element within the picture.
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A similar experience is recounted in a well-known passage from his Reminiscences when he returned to his studio at dusk and was astonished to see: "…an indescribably beautiful perceptual systems have to do work to make objects appear to us -a fact vividly revealed when those perceptual processes stumble or fail. Looking at an object, and being consciously aware of what we see, requires not simply that we passively register a pre-given external reality but that we actively construct an impression from the cues presented to us through the senses -a construction that is interpretative, necessarily incomplete, and vulnerable to error.
Making indeterminate art
This problematic link between what we see and what exists in the world has fascinated me as an artist for many years. Since the experience I described when watching the THE CABINET OF DR CALIGARI I have trying in one way or another to replicate the visually indeterminate experience I had then by making images that induce the same effect. Starting with film and photography, then working with computer generated images and digital collage, and finally with drawing and painting, I have attempted to make images that hover on the boundary between seeing and knowing, between being objectless and object-full. This has not been easy. To make an image that convinces a viewer there is something there to be seen while at the same time denying any opportunity to recognise what that might be has proven difficult. This is partly because the human visual system is so adept at recognising objects from the sketchiest of clues (think how a semi-colon and a bracket can conjure up a winking face ;) and partly because it is so ready to categorize as abstract or empty anything that appears to be noise, pattern or texture. Here are some further examples of my indeterminate paintings that play on the boundary between recognisability and abstraction.
[Insert Figure 3 ] 
Indeterminacy in BLOW-UP
BLOW-UP tells the story of a fashion photographer, played by David Hemmings, who becomes frustrated with shooting the models in his London studio and goes out to take photographs in a nearby park. There he secretly photographs a couple, becoming intrigued by the strange behaviour of the woman, played by Vanessa Redgrave. She sees him and runs after him, angry that he had been photographing her and asking for the film reel. He refuses, but she later turns up at the studio and tries again to persuade him to give up the film. He eventually agrees, but gives her another reel instead. Intrigued by why she was so keen to get the negatives from him he develops the shots, prints them, and examines them, trying to piece together the events that photos captured. His attention is drawn to a patch of indistinct foliage in one of the photographs, which he blows up and examines more closely. Here is a moment of visual indeterminacy. The dark and light patches in the image strongly suggest the presence of something that is at the same time absent, until he has a flash of recognition and resolves the indeterminacy. He realises he has inadvertently captured the moment when someone in the bushes is about to shoot the man he has been photographing, although we never find out exactly why these events have occurred. The film critic Sam Rohdie describes the significance of the sequence in the wider context of Antonioni's cinematic style:
Since things lack the final determinations of a closed structure of events, and since the entire binding of events in a plot and in a drama are loosened to the point of disappearance, the entire film, and any image in it, is threatened with indeterminacy: hence the oscillation as central to Antonioni's films and the problems the films pose of fixing a reality, of seizing upon a substance which seems so insubstantial, whose very presence is in doubt.
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The sequence makes an obvious play on the dual meaning of the word ,shoot', in the photographic and gun-related senses (in English at least). But it also probes the way we understand or make sense of the world around us by extracting meaningful information from the array of potentially significant clues available to our senses. It is legitimate to ask to what extent the figure in the bushes is really there prior to the moment the photographer recognizes it. At the moment of recognition the shadowy figure comes into being in a way it wasn't before. At what point, then, does it become ,real'? This filmic sequence in fact plays out over an extended period of time the almost instantaneous processes that occur in visual perception (and in fact in all modes of perception) from moment to moment when the chaotic flux of our indeterminate sensations are forced into conceptual categories, and so become determinate and meaningful things in the world.
Visual perception
Vision scientists often refer to two fundamental stages of vision, which normally occur almost simultaneously but occasionally disconnect or misalign. The first is sometimes called the ,early ', ,perceptual' or ,bottom up' layer. 7 Here the visual information received by the visual cortex is organised into formal properties of shapes, colour, line and motion. The world appears to us here in almost abstract terms, full of contrast, form, shade, pattern, but lacking distinct or recognizable objects, much as Kandinsky described the images he saw as ,objectless'. The other important aspect of vision is the ,cognitive', ,high-level' or ,top down' layer in which attaches meaningful information to the perceptual forms, identifying within it objects that correlate with our stored memories of things in the world built up over our lifetime. Normally these two layers work together almost immediately when we apprehend things in the world. But when errors creep in -either through temporary misperception or more permanent brain damage -the results can be profound. Figure 5 , somewhat laboriously, but did so without realizing that the image depicted an owl.
[Insert Figure One of the many interesting questions such cases raise is this: Where in reality is the owl?
For those of us with normally functioning perceptual systems we see the owl as really there;
but what John sees as real is an arrangement of abstract lines. John's visual system does not have the capacity to construct the owl from the information available in the picture, and so for him it does not exist. Yet for us looking at the same object it does. This demonstrates the way in which the appearance of reality for us has to be actively constructed by the perceptual system. It is not merely ,there' to be passively recorded, but has to purposefully sought out and discovered from a series of clues, in much the same way as the photographer in BLOW-UP hunt for meaning within his enlarged images. In the visually indeterminate image the link between the perceptual and cognitive layers is temporarily broken or frustrated. The act of trying to construct what is really there from the available clues is brought into the forefront of our minds, we become aware of it, and the reality we are used to finding ,out there' immediately is removed from our grasp.
Richter and indeterminacy
The contemporary German artist Gerhard Richter is somewhat unusual among artists (but by no means unique) in that he works in a number of quite distinct styles. He is particularly 
Images and reality
Prior to the convulsions of the European avant-garde movement in art in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century there was a general understanding that what the still camera, and by extension the movie camera, did was to present reality to us ,as it is', that is, in an objective, accurate and determinate form. The optical media of photography was seen to be able to replace, in a faster and more efficient way, the role of painting in capturing visual experience in tangible and permanent matter. The overwhelming assumption throughout a large part of European history is that a picture should represent some aspect of external reality, albeit in a more or less detailed or stylized way. Some art historians have seen the history of art, at least in pre-Modernist epochs, as a series of continuous steps towards achieving the near photographic rendering of the world in representational form.
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Many of the art movements that broadly made up the avant-garde resisted or reacted against this notion, and often resulted in the making of images that left audiences being confused about what the image they were seeing was supposed to be. Even at a time when his work was quite readable by today's standards, the British Romantic artist J M W Turner found himself subject to rebuke and ridicule when exhibiting publicly some of his atmospheric landscapes in the early nineteenth century. One critic wrote:
Mr. Turner has doubtless heard that obscurity is one source of the sublime, and he has certainly given to the picture a full measure of this kind of sublimity. Perhaps his work may be best described by what a lady said of it -that it is all flags and smoke.
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Even some years after his death, Turner still had an international reputation as an artist who confused his public. In 1871 a French critic wrote:
His painting degenerated into lunacy. [His late works] compose an extraordinary jumble, a sort of churned foam, a wonderful litter in which shapes of every kind are buried. Place a man in a fog, in the midst of a storm, the sun in his eyes, and his head swimming, and depict, if The European avant-garde, then, could be held responsible in large part for a general shift in how we understand the relationship between images and reality, away from the simple view that painting and photographs clearly show us the world ,as it is' towards one of much greater complexity, even confusion where we can't be certain of what we are seeing, or have to work hard to interpret the visual material before us. The facile or easy link between external reality and its pictorial representation was successively broken throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Richter himself is both an inheritor of a contributor to this modernist tradition in which the artist challenged and subverted the realistic intent of figurative representations and forced viewers into an active struggle to recover the meaning of the work as opposed to being a passive recipient of pre-formed determinates.
In Richter's work there is no simple demarcation between the real and the abstract, the factual and the interpreted. In fact, he goes so far as to reverse, or at least upset, the conventional understanding of the relationship between reality and the way it is depicted in photographs and paintings. He has said for example: 
Indeterminacy and reality
The phenomenon of visual indeterminacy disturbs the apparently direct or immediate relationship between external reality and how we perceive it and represent it; it prevents us making an easy connection between what we see and what is ,out there'. I would also argue that the experience of the visually indeterminate transcends the simple binary abstract/real distinction by which we define so many images and so much art by bringing the externally real and the internally real together in the act of imaginative interpretation. We are reminded that all experience of reality is a matter of interpretation; nothing ,out there' is inherently meaningless or meaningful until we chose make it so. In this sense all perceptual acts are interpretative, although we tend to overlook this since the process of interpretation occurs seemingly immediately and in most cases effortlessly. But occasionally we face a situation -as I did watching THE CABINET OF DR CALIGARI or as the Hemmings character did in BLOW-UP looking at the enlarged photographs -where the immediate grasp of the 20 Elger and Obrist, p. 273. 21 For example: Misty Self-Portrait (18.1.1990 ), 1990 , Anthony d'Offay Gallery, London, UK.
depiction is frustrated, and we are forced to struggle to recover or sense of the reality of the world around us.
It in this indeterminate state of perception that we come closer (perhaps as close as we can ever come) to experiencing reality as it exists before we determine, for our own purposes, what we take it to be. The process of visual indeterminacy slows down, and in doing so makes us aware of, the way our perceptual systems work to construct an ,appearance of reality' that is as much subjective as it is objective, as much a product of our own manufacture as it is of any external, independent world properties. This is why I argue visual indeterminacy is of fundamental importance in understanding not only great historical shifts in art and the motivations of important artists but the very nature of perception and our relationship to the world. The consequences of this realization are profound: if we are always complicit in the production of reality then we can no longer enforce a clear demarcation between an external objective world and an internal subjective experience, just as we can no longer enforce an easy separation between perception of the world and our imaginings of it.
In these terms, subjective experience becomes part of objective reality, indeed the very fabric within which it is created. This sense of how reality coincides with the way it appears to us is captured in this final statement from Richter: "I never wanted to capture and hold reality in a painting. Maybe in a weak moment I did, but I don't remember. However, that was never my intention. But I wanted to paint the appearance of reality. That is my theme or job." 22
